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A REVIEW OF THE UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST ACT
Arthur D. Wolfe*
This article presents a summary and analysis of the important
provisions of the Uniform State Antitrust Act. Work on
this act by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws started in 1961 and at least two
drafts were developed (1963 and 1965)1 before this final
version was approved on August 2, 1973.2 The act was also
approved by the American Bar Association House of Delegates
on February 5, 1974. To date, Arizona is the only state
which has adopted the act.
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The Commissioners believed that there was a need for a
state-level antitrust act because some restraints of trade
are solely intrastate in nature (and not, therefore, subject
to federal jurisdiction) and some states do not have anti-
trust laws to reach such restraints;4 moreover, there is
a tremendous diversity of legislation between those states
which do have such legislation and the drafters believed
compliance would be promoted through the adoption of a
uniform act.5
Definitions and Exclusions
The act covers all legal persons. This includes individuals,
corporations, business trusts and partnerships or any
other legal entity.
A violation must occur in a relevant market which is defined
both geographically and according to product by Section 1.
The geographic market is the area of actual or potential
competition. The product market is defined as a line of
commerce. All or any part of this relevant market must be
within an individual state. 6 Since.the act does state
"parts" of markets may be within states it may be assumed
that the entire relevant market may extend beyond state
lines and thus may be interstate in character. When this
is true both private and governmental plaintiffs will have
a choice of using the state or federal courts. For the
reasons stated below, non-government plaintiffs would cer-
tainly choose the federal system.
In language identical ot that of the Clayton Act, 7 labor,
agricultural or horticultural organizations instituted for
the purpose of mutual help are excluded. The labor of a
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human being is also excluded as not being a commodity or
article of commerce.
Violations
Sections 2 and 3 are the operative parts of the act and are
quoted below in their entirety:
Section 2. A contract, combination or con-
spiracy between two or more persons in re-
straint of, or to monopolize, trade or
commerce in a relevant market is unlawful.
Section 3. The establishment, maintenance
or use of a monopoly, or an attempt to
establish a monopoly, of trade or commerce
in a relevant market by any person, for the
purpose of excluding competition or con-
trolling, fixing, or maintaining prices, is
unlawful.
Section 2 of the act combines the conspiracy aspects of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act 8 with the establishment of
monopoly aspects of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, thus
declaring conspiracies in restraint of trade or con-
tracts or conspiracies to monopolize to be illegal.
Joint activity is the key to a violation of Section 2.
Section 3 contains two major elements. Not only must
monopoly power or an attempt to use or establish it be
proved, but the purpose of the monopoly must be to exclude
competition or control price. By adding the last ele-
ment of unlawful purpose, the drafters are making it clear
that a violation would occur only upon proof of an anti-
competitive intent. In the absence of proof of this
intent, monopolies would be legal. The drafters
recognized that monopolies (by definition, one seller in
a relevant market) do exist in many smaller communities
because the economic base in such communities cannot
support more than one seller.
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Investigations
The longest and most detailed portion of the act concerns
"official Investigations." It provides that if the state
attorney general has reasonable cause to believe that a
person has information or evidence relevant to an in-
vestigation for a violation, he may examine that person under
oath, or demand the production of tangible evidence. This
demand may be made before an action is initiated (emphasis
mine).
The express right of the attorney general to demand this
evidence from any person before filing suit is, potentially,
the strongest and most noteworthy provision of the act.
Currently, only fifteen states expressly provide within
their respective antitrust statutory schemes for the power
to compel disclosure of evidence before suit.1 0 However,
in some states, the attorney general may have this power
otherwise conferred by existing law. Nevertheless, an
attorney general with a consumer-oriented perspective might
wield substantial power in the use of this demand-for-
evidence provision by asking pertinent questions about
pricing practices or requesting certain evidence. The
comments to the act state that this power to demand
evidence extends beyond that provided in federal law since
tangible objects may be discovered (rather than "docu-
mentary materials" as allowed by federal law I1 ) and
the demand may be made of any person, not just the one
under investigation.12
The act, however, provides substantial protection for the
one from whom the information is sought. This protection
may easily thwart the investigatory power outlined above.
Section 6(b) provides that if a person objects, the
attorney general must go to a court where the person
resides or has his principal place of business to request
a petition ordering disclosure of the information. The
court must find that there is reasonable cause to be-
lieve there has been a violation of the act and the in-
formation sought is relevant to this violation. So, in
cases where the attorney general attempts to demand evi-
dence before trial, the one subject to the demand may
force the issue into court by objecting. Most prudent
attorneys for potential defendants will most likely ob-
ject, thus, one must conclude, the investigatory powers
are substantially reduced and may add nothing new to the
powers most attorneys general already have.
Remedy
The remedy provisions are separated into two major sections.
The first, Section 7, allows the attorney general, or a
prosecutor with the attorney general's permission or at
his request (emphasis mine) to ask for injunctive relief
or a civil penalty or not more than $50,000 for each vio-
lation. It is the court that assesses this penalty for
the benefit of the state. It should be emphasized that
the privilege of asking the court for this penalty or
injunctive relief is tied directly to the permission of
the state's highest law enforcement officer. The reasons
for this do not appear in the official comments to the
act. One may argue that a local prosecutor, for
political reasons, would be hesitant to bring a suit
requesting the penalty against a local violator; but,
under the above Section 7, he should ask for the penalty
if the attorney general requests him to do so. If this
is the drafters' intent, should there not have been
included a provision in the act requiring a local prose-
cutor to inform the attorney general when the prosecutor
is contemplating an antitrust suit? Without this pro-
vision, the attorney general may not learn of the alleged
violation and thus the potential for recovering the
penalty.13
Or, one may imagine a situation in which a local prose-
cutor wants to request the penalty of the court, but this
is not allowed because the attorney general withholds per-
mission for political or other reasons. It seems that this
contingency is a real possibility since the act does require
a request from the prosecutor to the attorney general in
every instance. It may be argued that this provision will
protect local violators from prosecutors who hold a grudge;
but, the violator is already protected from this by pro-
viding that the court assess the penalty upon the request
of the prosecutor.
Perhaps these objections to this provision are ill founded
since in reality local prosecutors do not have the exper-
tise to try an antitrust suit; therefore, almost all
prosecutions will be initiated by the attorney general.
Nevertheless, it is rare that a local prosecutor's judgment
as to selection of the penalty is usurped by the attorney
general. Certainly the pros and cons of this potential
political aspect of the act should be debated by the
several legislatures.
Finally, it should be noted that the severity of this fine
($50,000) is minimal in light of the fact that some states
presently provide for revocation of a corporation's
charter upon conviction of an antitrust violation.
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The second damage section contains two subsections.
Section 8a provides that the state, a political sub-
division or any public agency may sue a violator for in-
junctive relief and damages actually caused. Taxable
costs and attorney's fees may be assessed by the court.
Section 8b provides that a person (defined in Section 1 as
an individual, corporation, business trust, partnership,
association, or any other legal entity) may request
appropriate injunctive relief, damages and, to be determined
by the court, costs and a reasonable attorneys' fees.
It further provides:
If the trier of fact finds that the violation is
flagrant, it may increase recovery to an amount
not in excess of three times the damages sus-
tained.
A potential interpretation problem is created by allowing
"persons . . . or any other legal entity" to request treble
damages when it appears to be the obvious intent of
Section 8a to provide for (and yet limit) the recovery
of governmental agencies to single damages. The language
of Section 8b should have expressly excluded public agen-
cies, because allowing "any legal entity" to ask for
treble damages creates an ambiguity. Also, a definition of
public agency in Section 8a would be helpful. For ex-
ample, is a government owned utility or a housing authority
a public agency?
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The greatest weakness of the act is confining the recovery
of treble damages to those instances in which the trier of
fact finds the violation flagrant. A flagrant violation is
not defined in the act, nor are the elements of a flagrant
violation familiar to the law.1 6 Of the 15 states presently
providing for multiple damage recovery,1 7 only New Hampshire
limits the recovery to wilfull or flagrant violations. 8
There is no case law in New Hampshire which adds meaning
to the phrase of "wilfull or flagrant" violations. By
first of all limiting the private treble damage action to
a finding of a flagrant violation on the part of the trier
of fact and then by failing to define flagrant, the act
discourages private actions.
It is quite obvious that some of the drafters viewed the
private, treble-damage remedy not as it was intended to
involve the private sector in antitrust enforcement,1 9 but
as a burdensome penalty. 20 This circumstance is extremely
unfortunate. It is common knowledge that the trial of an
antitrust case demands specialized talents and expertise.
This expertise exists in the private sector and in the
Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission of the
United States. Since the latter must confine their
efforts to interstate violations, this places the burden
for antitrust enforcement of intrastate violations on the
private sector. By limiting private litigants' recovery
to undefined instances of flagrant violations, a large
incentive to the private litigant is eliminated. It is
obvious that if it can be argued reasonably that the vio-
lation is interstate in character, all private litigants will
opt for the federal courts. Indeed, some states with treble
damage provisions in their current laws have experienced
few or no attempts to use the state law and courts.
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With private litigants discouraged from using the act
because of the above reasons, the burden of enforcing
the act must fall on the states' attorneys general office,
institutions which, generally speaking, lack the special-
ized knowledge to prosecute the antitrust violator.
2 2
Other Important Provisions
A final judgment in favor of the state is prima facie
evidence against the defendant in a subsequent private
action. But, this applies only to those matters finally
adjudicated between the state and the defendant.
Finally, the state must bring its action within four
years after the cause of action accrues. Private parties
must begin suit for damages within the same time or within
one year after the conclusion of a suit initiated by the
state, whichever is later.
Conclusions
It is noteworthy that the act does not expressly mention
mergers. One may surmise that a merger or acquisition
which would be a violation under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act 2 3 would be a violation of either Section 2 of this act
(a contract or combination to monopolize) or Section 3
(an attempt to establish a monopoly). Yet, if the drafters
wanted to deal with mergers and acquisitions why were they
not more explicit? Also, unfair trade practices are an
obvious omission.
One cannot argue with the proposition that if all states
adopt this act an obvious measure of uniformity would be
achieved. This uniformity would certainly make it easier
for a corporation to defend itself against alleged violations
brought by more than one state. Also, the act does give
state attorneys general an explicit investigatory pre-
rogative which may not be enjoyed at the present time.
The wise use of this power may thwart some restraints of
trade.
Against these benefits one must weigh what might be lost
by adopting this act in its present form. Practically,
by limiting the treble damage recovery to flagrant vio-
lations, 2 4 the private sector enforcement potential is
lost. If the federal experience has been that private
enforcement of the antitrust laws is both desirable and
effective, then the public interest is not served by elim-
inating this potential for enforcement on the state level.
In short, the weaknesses of the act in tying the request
for a civil penalty to the permission of the attorney
general in cases by the government, in not defining "public
agency" in Section 8 and in predicating the recovery of
treble damages upon the finding of a "flagrant" vio-
lation, outweigh whatever strengths or benefits which might
accrue because of uniformity. If the act could be re-
written eliminating these weaknesses, then considerably
more enthusiasm for the act may be generated.
It is true that many state antitrust laws were adopted
in the late 19th century and have never been enforced.
A reasonable approach for finding an explanation for this
inactivity would have been to survey all of the attorneys
general of the states with such laws. If the antitrust
laws of the several states were needlessly complex or too
severe in the potential penalty or antiquated for
numerous reasons, then a model act,one which could be
amended, and not a uniform act, predicated upon unsub-
stantiated notions of increased compliance because of
uniformity, would have been the logical remedy.
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